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Foreign direct investment has played an important role in the apparel export industry in 
Ethiopia, but what makes Ethiopia different to most other Sub-Saharan African 
countries is the existence of locally owned exporting firms. There were 48 Ethiopian-
owned firms in 2016, of which 14 firms were exporting apparel or made-up textiles. To 
export, local firms have to be able to deliver consistently products at a certain price and 
quality and to meet delivery deadlines, which require developing new technological 
capabilities. This paper analyses the level of capabilities among Ethiopian-owned 
exporting firms and their positions within the apparel global value chain, as well as how 
they have fared and which challenges they continue to face. Generally, the 14 local 
exporting firms have low technological capabilities and struggle to meet export 
requirements, despite important diversity among them. Learning is a costly process and 
takes time, thus many local firms are experiencing losses or just break even in their 
export business. Straddling the domestic and export market plays an important role, as 
firms make profits in the protected domestic market while they are learning how to meet 
the cost, quality and delivery standards of export markets. Therefore, most local firms 
use the domestic market as a means to subsidize the cost of learning to compete, but 
they also use what they learn through exporting in terms of productivity, quality and 
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Mapping the Technological Capabilities of Ethiopian-owned Firms in the Apparel 
Global Value Chain 
Introduction 
The apparel export sector in Ethiopia emerged as a result of a combination of factors, 
including comparatively low labor costs, duty free access to the EU market under 
Everything But Arms and to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunities 
Act, active industrial policies targeting the apparel sector, and the decisions of some EU 
and US buyers to convince their core suppliers to invest in or source from Ethiopia.1 
Foreign direct investment played an important role in starting the apparel export industry 
in Ethiopia and in driving its growth, but what makes Ethiopia different from most other 
Sub-Saharan African countries is the existence of locally owned exporting firms.  
In 2016, there were 84 apparel and textile firms in Ethiopia.2 This total included 4 
spinning mills, 15 textile mills, 16 vertically integrated textile and apparel firms, and 49 
solely apparel firms. There were 48 Ethiopian-owned firms, comprised of 32 apparel 
firms, 8 integrated textile firms, and 8 vertically integrated textile and apparel firms. 
However, only 14 of these local firms were engaged in exporting in 2016, and only 2 
firms were exporting 100% of their production. The other 12 firms produced both for the 
domestic market and for export. These local exporting firms include a range of ownership 
types: private, private diaspora, state-owned, and party-owned. They include firms that 
started out purely exporting, as well as firms that started producing for the domestic 
market and later began exporting. 
For local firms, the comparatively low costs of labor, trade preferences, and the interest 
of EU and US buyers to source from Ethiopia are important, but taking advantage of the 
possibilities offered by these factors to enter and remain in the apparel export sector is 
not easy. In addition to having low production costs, including wages, firms have to be 
able to deliver consistently products of a certain quality and to meet delivery deadlines. 
Meeting the cost, quality and delivery requirements of global buyers requires that 
Ethiopian-owned firms develop new technological capabilities. These capabilities include 
not only manufacturing capabilities related to production processes, but also non-
manufacturing capabilities such as sourcing inputs from across the globe, product 
1 For a detailed discussion of the emergence and evolution of the apparel export sector in Ethiopia, see 
Staritz and Whitfield (2017b). 
2 Available figures on the number of firms show some discrepancy. We used the Ethiopian Textile Sector
Profile of January 2016 from the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute as a basis, which was 
adapted based on findings during our fieldwork. For more details, see Staritz and Whitfield (2017b). 
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development, inventory management and stock holding, logistics and financing, 
communicating with buyers, and meeting labor and environmental standards. These are 
the minimum criteria for entering and remaining in the apparel global value chain.  
 
This paper analyses the level of capabilities among Ethiopian-owned firms and their 
positions within the apparel global value chain, as well as how they have fared and which 
challenges they continue to face. The motivation behind this objective was developed in 
the first working paper of the AfriCap project, which argues that technological 
capabilities are crucial for firms to become and remain competitive in global export 
sectors and that they have to be conceptualized and assessed in the context of globalized 
production arrangements in which the majority of trade takes place (Staritz and Whitfield 
2017a). The first step in understanding how locally owned firms build capabilities and 
learn is to assess what capabilities these firms actually have, before we can move to 
explaining what factors affect their level of capabilities and the channels through which 
firms learn. We also wanted to get a sense of how much variation there is among 
Ethiopian-owned firms, and thus it is important to assess local firms’ capabilities in a way 
that allows for comparison across firms. 
 
This assessment of local firms is based on a survey conducted with all 14 of the local 
firms engaged in exporting in June 2016. The survey questionnaire was designed based 
on the technological capabilities matrix specified for the apparel global value chain, and 
the matrix is used as the benchmark for assessing the capabilities of Ethiopian-owned 
firms. This matrix was first presented in Staritz and Whitfield (2017a) and is explained 
again in this paper. The 14 local exporting firms are scored based on their function in the 
apparel global value chain, as well as on indicators of their product, production, end-
market and linkage capabilities. Some of the indicators are based on quantitative 
information, such as number of buyers, while other indicators are a composite subjective 
score based on several questions that involved a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data. The method used in moving from the survey questions to the key 
indicators for scoring is explained in detail in the paper. 
 
Generally, the 14 local exporting firms have low technological capabilities and struggle 
to meet export requirements, despite important diversity among them. Two firms have 
mixed overall scores, because they are vertically integrated textile and apparel firms that 
use their own textile for their apparel exports but are only exporting made-up textiles (e.g. 
bed sheets and towels) and also have low capabilities in other areas. Of the 12 other firms, 
50% score an overall low on technological capabilities, 25% score medium-low and the 
remaining 25% score medium. These 12 firms include firms only involved in sewing 
apparel (CMT) as well as firms also involved in input sourcing (FOB) and textile 
production (FOB-textile). There are FOB and CMT firms with comparatively higher 
capabilities, including stable relationships with buyers; and there are FOB and CMT firms 
that are struggling in developing the capabilities most important for their specific 
function, which also have more unstable buyer relationships. Generally, there is a trend 
towards FOB and also vertical integration to FOB-textile. The latter is seen as a way to 
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become competitive and increase value added in the context of Ethiopia where factors 
exogenous to the firms result in delays to receive inputs, combined with firms’ lack of 
experience with global inputs sourcing. This allows firms to build on the existence of 
local textile and cotton production, but requires updating machinery and technology in 
textiles to be able to fulfill buyers’ fabric requirements. There is also a group of local 
firms that remain CMT suppliers and are focusing on deepening production and product 
capabilities within that function. Such a strategy seems to be possible and sustainable 
with certain buyers that prefer CMT as well as understand the context of Ethiopia, 
particularly in terms of meeting delivery times. 
 
The paper has six sections. The next section discusses what technological capabilities are 
required to enter the apparel global value chain and remain competitive, as well as to 
capture more value. This is followed by an overview of the key characteristics of the 14 
local exporting firms. The third section discusses how technological capabilities were 
measured, explaining the use of certain indicators and how scores have been produced. 
The next sections analyse and compare the scores of the 14 local firms based on the survey 
results as well as how these technological capabilities scores relate to competitiveness 
measures. These sections also identify different trajectories among these 14 firms that 




Technological capabilities required in the apparel global value chain 
 
Table 1 presents a matrix describing the technological capabilities demanded to enter to, 
remain competitive and to capture increasing value in the apparel global value chain. The 
types of categories of technological capabilities in each column reflect what is important 
to entering and remaining competitive in global value chains, but also reflect that firms 
can deepen and strengthen their capabilities within a specific node in a global value chain. 
They include investment, production (with the sub-categories process and product) and 
linkages (with the sub-categories supply chain, end market, and logistics, finance and 
support). The vertical axis of the table corresponds with functional upgrading, as moving 
to different functions in the value chain often requires more complex capabilities. Thus, 
each row indicates that firms are operating at a particular node in the global value chain. 
The technological capability matrix for the apparel global value chain was created based 
on information collected and analyzed from existing literature combined with our 
previous work on apparel industries (for a more detailed discussion on the matrix see 
Staritz and Whitfield 2017a).  
 
The apparel matrix has five rows: Cut-Make-Trim (CMT) subcontracting, CMT with 
direct buyer link, full package/free on board (FOB), original design manufacturer (ODM) 
and textile vertical integration (Gereffi 1999). The first step to enter apparel global value 
chains is often through CMT subcontracting. This is related to difficulties in establishing 
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direct relationships with buyers and often involves subcontracting work for foreign 
owned firms, but may also include larger local firms with established buyer relationships. 
CMT subcontracting involves generally three steps: fabric is cut and bundled by style, 
size and color; the different sewing steps are performed; and the finished products are 
trimmed, checked for quality control, and packed for shipment. A CMT supplier may also 
only fulfill the “make” step, but generally they do all three steps.  Even these simple 
activities have to be fulfilled by complying with buyers’ or first tier suppliers’ process 
and product requirements, which already requires quite high capabilities with regard to 
production. These requirements include price, quality, reliability, lead times and 
flexibility, and fulfillment of specific process and product standards, as well as labor and 
environmental compliance.  
 
In this context, the first upgrading step is normally to strengthen and deepen these 
capabilities and later on to diversify first tier suppliers and build direct links with buyers. 
The most important new activity in functional upgrading from being a subcontractor to 
establishing a direct link with buyers is generally pattern/sample making, which is critical 
for getting direct orders from buyers. This necessitates at least a small sampling room 
with a few good technicians that can provide samples at rather short lead times. Within 
the category CMT, there can be quite a large variation among firms in terms of deepening 
capabilities. Improving production processes is where firms will put most effort in the 
initial phase. This might also include investment in automatic cutting equipment, which 
can help improve quality and save on fabric consumption. But deepening capabilities also 
involves products, because CMT suppliers can be very different in terms of the 
complexity and variety of products produced. Hence, after deepening production 
processes, firms may diversify or change to more complex products before engaging in 
functional upgrading. 
 
The next functional upgrading step is full package, where the supplier purchases fabric 
and all other inputs required for apparel production, provides all production services, 
finishing, and packaging and is responsible up to loading onto the export carriers. The 
customer provides the design and often specifies textile suppliers. This requires no new 
functions in production processes and products, but additional functions in financing and 
managing the sourcing of inputs and part of the transport of inputs and outputs and being 
able to deal with related risks. Another additional activity that full package suppliers have 
to fulfill is pricing. Hence, these are new areas of capabilities that are not “simply learnt” 
on the way while being involved in CMT production. The shift from CMT to full package 
may be associated with the development of a domestic textile industry, as this makes 
input sourcing easier. If apparel exporters rely on imported inputs, then some financing 
mechanism to allow them to get access to foreign exchange and a working capital advance 
is required at the country level to allow for FOB operations.  
 
The next step involves upgrading to ODM where the supplier is involved in the design 
and product development process, including the approval of samples and the selection, 
purchase or production of required materials. This again does not change much the 
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capabilities required for the production process, but requires particularly new capabilities 
in product development and design, including investing in Computer Aided Design 
equipment and capabilities. ODM generally also requires more marketing skills, as own 
designs have to be actively sold to buyers with the aim to replace buyer designs by own 
designed products.  
 
It is important to note that upgrading processes may often happen in parallel. For example, 
on the way to full package supplier, the deepening of production functions that are already 
required for CMT production may take place. Further, when developing ODM 
capabilities, diversifying to new buyers that more extensively demand product 
development and design services can be required, as the investment in these new 
capabilities needs to pay off. Hence, these investments and the related change in 
production set up can make it unprofitable for a firm to remain a CMT or full package 
supplier. 
 
The link to regional or domestic markets complicates this upgrading picture further, as 
firms that supply these markets in addition to global export markets often fulfill different 
functions in these various markets. Often they are in charge of input sourcing and also 
design or even branding in the domestic market (with variation in regional markets) that 
require related capabilities. Hence, firms can be full package or even ODM suppliers in 
the domestic market and CMT suppliers in the global export market. They can even be 
involved in selling their own brands (as own brand manufacturer, OBM) and in retailing 
in the domestic market alongside CMT export production.  
 
The capabilities needed in different foreign export markets also vary significantly. EU 
buyers generally demand lower volumes, more complex products, higher flexibility and 
broader capabilities in the area of product development and design. In contrast, US buyers 
demand larger volumes, stricter quality standards and the ability to produce to buyer 
specifications (Gibbon 2008). A share of EU and US buyers, particularly retailers, also 
increasingly demand full package capabilities from their suppliers. US and EU buyers 
both demand social compliance, but they have different standards. US buyers generally 
refer to Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP), while EU buyers refer 
to Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). Regional and domestic buyers are 
generally less strict concerning social compliance or do not look at this at all. 
Environmental compliance has also become more important, particularly for textile firms 
or vertically integrated firms, with the most important certificates including ISO 14001 
(environmental management systems) and Ecotex.  
 
With regard to supply chain linkages, there are several categories of inputs required in 
apparel production: direct raw material inputs (e.g., fabric and yarn); apparel trim and 
accessories (e.g., buttons, zippers, thread, elastic, labels, hangers); non-essential inputs 
such as packaging (e.g. cartons and poly bags); capital equipment and machinery parts; 
and broad services applicable to a range of industries such as transportation, logistics, 
catering, IT, construction, cleaning, security, human resource and training. Furthermore, 
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there are possibilities for subcontracting linkages, where subcontractors perform a portion 
of assembly or finishing activities on behalf of the supplier. The most important supply 
chain linkages are to the textile sector, as fabrics are the most expensive input into apparel 
production and the quality of textiles is directly related to the apparel product’s quality 
(Staritz and Frederick 2012). 
 
The last functional upgrading step involves vertical integration into textiles. This 
generally does not take place in a sequence from apparel production to textile production, 
but rather most firms that are vertically integrated have always done textile along apparel 
or started with textile and added apparel later. Textile (fabric and yarn) production 
requires different capabilities, because it is more capital-, infrastructure-, skill- and scale-
intensive (Staritz and Frederick 2012). For investments into textile production, a 
minimum scale is required due to its scale-intensive nature. Thus, a certain minimum size 
of the apparel industry locally or regionally is a requirement for textile investments.3 
Further, access to finance is crucial for textile investment due to the capital-intensity of 
fabric and yarn production. Reliable and low-cost infrastructure is also more important 
for textile production, in particular with regard to electricity and water. Textile production 
requires more skilled labor with technical experience using industrial machinery as well 
as quality control personnel. Besides these issues related to local capabilities and the local 
business environment, sourcing policies of buyers or first tier supplier are also crucial to 
determine the extent of backward linkages into textile production. Many global buyers 
and first tier suppliers require suppliers to import inputs from specified textile mills for 
their orders, which limits vertical integration or local linkage possibilities.
                                                            
3 This is particularly the case in the woven segment of textile production, as it requirers a larger scale.  
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Table 1   Apparel GVC Technological Capabilities Matrix 
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textile/trim product 
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Getting access to input 
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related instruments 
(L/C) 
Controlling total supply 
chain lead times & 
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Overview of local firm survey and exporting firms 
 
The categories of capabilities and related indicators described in the apparel global value 
chain matrix presented in Table 1 were used to develop the local firm survey 
questionnaire (see Annex 1).4 The survey questions identified the functions within the 
apparel GVC that local firms perform and then assessed their performance of those 
functions across the categories of capabilities. The questionnaire included questions with 
both quantitative and qualitative answers, where for the latter firms were asked questions 
with a range of set responses to choose from as well as open-ended questions. Although 
the questions were aimed to examine the current conditions of the firms at the moment of 
the survey (June 2016), firms were asked questions about their initial experience and 
investment capabilities. The questionnaire was relatively long, but not all questions were 
relevant for all firms; the specific set of questions asked depended on their functions 
within the apparel GVC. Additionally, if the interviewee was pressed for time, the survey 
interview was limited to the core questions for each category of capabilities, which were 
indicated in bold on the questionnaire. These core questions were asked in all survey 
interviews in order to have a minimum base of comparable data. However, in a few 
instances, data on some of these questions are missing. 
 
The questionnaire was administered to 18 local firms that we thought were exporting, 
based on data collected from the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute.5 
During the survey process, we found that only 14 of these firms were actually exporting 
at that time. One of the 4 firms not exporting anymore had been engaged in CMT-
subcontracting for a foreign firm, but had stopped and was undertaking investments in 
new equipment and facilities that would allow it to produce its own fabric for apparel 
exports. Another firm had previously exported, but had lost buyers and was looking for 
new ones, and thus was not exporting at the time of the survey despite a state-of-the art 
apparel factory. In a similar situation, another firm was exporting only a negligible 
amount and had effectively decided to stop exporting apparel and was shifting into 
training in fashion design. Moving in the opposite direction, the final firm had been 
exporting in the regional East Africa market and producing for the domestic market, and 
was attempting to move into the international export market, but was still in the process 
of investing in the right equipment, facilities and scale to produce for the US market. 
While the experiences of these four firms are very important and inform the overall study 
                                                            
4 The order of the questions in the questionnaire does not directly correspond to the matrix, as the 
questions had to be ordered and asked in a way that made sense in an interview.  
5 In many cases the questionnaire was administered to the owner or owners of the firm. In some cases this 
was not possible, and the questionnaire was administered to the general manager or production manager. 
Where possible the survey interview was held at the site of the factory, or the factory was visited after the 
survey interview, sometimes to collect missing data from the production manager. Only 1 of the factories 
located in or around Addis Ababa was not visited, and the survey interview took place with the owner in 
his Addis office. Concerning the 4 firms that are located in the Amhara and Tigray regions, the survey 
interviews were carried out with staff in their head office in Addis Ababa, typically the export marketing 
manager. 
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on local firm learning and building capabilities, this working paper only considers the 14 
local firms that were exporting at the time of the survey, as it was only possible to capture 
accurate and comparable data for these firms. 
 
The ownership profile of these 14 local firms engaged in exporting apparel and made-up 
textiles is quite diverse. Most of the state-owned firms in the sector were privatized, but 
two could not be sold and thus were rehabilitated by the government. The private owned 
firms can be categorized into different types: one endowment-owned firm linked to the 
TPLF party, a firm that is part of Al-Amoudi’s MIDROC diversified business group, 4 
firms owned by Ethiopian diaspora who do not have official citizenship6, and all other 
private owned firms that are either part of a diversified business or single operations.7  
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the key characteristics of these firms. The table shows the 
year when firms started exporting, including whether they started by sub-contracting for 
another firm; whether they are apparel, integrated textile or integrated textile and apparel 
firms; what percentage of their production is for the export market (roughly); their main 
export products; their main end markets; and their function within the global value chain: 
CMT, FOB or FOB with their own fabric (FOB-textile). There are no Ethiopian-owned 
firms engaged in ODM for global buyers, but some firms have their own designs and 
brands in the domestic market, such as Lucy Garments (men’s formal shirt brand) and 
Almeda (t-shirt brand). 
 
The two state-owned firms are both vertically integrated textile mills producing woven 
fabric and made-up textiles (bedsheets and towels), which makes them different to the 
other firms that are all involved in apparel production. These state-owned firms export 
because they were pushed by the government to do so, after the investments in renovation 
and upgrading their factories. One of them only started exporting made-up textiles in 
2015, while the other began exporting in 2009/10 with buyers who supply hospitals in 
Italy and Switzerland. The latter has ambitions to move into polycotton knit textile and 
apparel production for the US market, and has a proposal with the government to finance 
this expansion project through the Ministry of Public Enterprise (which provides zero 
interest loans) or through the Development Bank of Ethiopia. 
 
What is noticeable for the firms exporting apparel is that Ethiopian-owned firms are 
selling to the same small group of buyers and that these buyers circulated among local 
firms to find suppliers that could deliver and to reach required scales. US buyers are 
concentrated among three sportswear and workwear buyers that source largely basic and 
some intermediate woven products from Ethiopian-owned firms. Only two other buyers 
                                                            
6 This group includes Ethiopians who have lived abroad for a long time and returned to Ethiopia in the 
1990s or 2000s. They kept the citizenship of the country in which they were living, but acquired a status 
in Ethiopia that gives them all the rights of Ethiopian citizens except the right to vote. 
7 For more background information on local ownership, see Staritz and Whitfield (2017b). 
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selling to the US were mentioned, and both are intermediaries. With the emergence of 
large-scale foreign direct investment in the industrial parks, other large US buyers have 
started sourcing from Ethiopia, but these buyers require large quantities and specifications 
they cannot get from Ethiopian-owned firms. Hence, up to now they only source from 
foreign firms that largely have already been their global suppliers and have located part 
of their production in Ethiopia.  
 
European buyers are slightly more diverse. There are 8 different buyers sourcing basic 
and some intermediate knit products from Ethiopian-owned firms. The specific types of 
products among knit or woven that local firms produce are determined by the buyers that 
local firms are able to secure, and given instability in these relations may change from 
one order to another. These EU buyers include H&M, which sells largely to the EU but 
also to the US; Teddy Group and Lidl/Distra, which sell to the EU; Miss Kelani, George 
and Trimark, which sell to the UK; and Kik that sells to Germany. Most of these EU 
buyers demand that their suppliers produce FOB. Given the non-availability of suitable 
local textile inputs and thus the need to import textile inputs, FOB production is very 
challenging for local firms, due to problems in accessing working capital in foreign 
currency with which to buy inputs and long, unpredictable lead times for importing and 
exporting. Only recently have these infrastructural and financing challenges been 
addressed. T-shirts is the most common product sourced by EU buyers from Ethiopia. 
Some suppliers are developing their own fabric to be used, particularly for t-shirts, or plan 
to do so in the future, to deal with the import challenges and to improve value added and 
lead times.  
 
The most prominent EU buyer that has marketed its move to Ethiopia is H&M. It opened 
an office in Ethiopia in 2012 and began trying to source from local firms to supply its 
retail shops in the EU and the US market. As of 2016, only two local firms produced for 
H&M, as H&M faced challenges to secure suitable and reliable FOB supply from more 
local firms and has shifted to sourcing mostly from foreign firms in Ethiopia. One of the 
local firms supplying H&M is an apparel factory and has to import fabric, while the other 
has knit fabric production and has been approved by H&M to use its own fabric. Several 
other local firms tried to produce for H&M, but stopped for several reasons. One of the 
main reason is that integrated textile and apperal firms that want to use their own fabric 
had to invest in a new waste water treatment plant that meets the standards set by H&M. 
This was the case for at least two local firms. Many local firms with only apparel facilities 
commented that the margins were too low with H&M in relation to their high 
requirements and particularly when the fabric had to be imported. Hence, supplying H&M 
was not profitable for them. Part of the issue with profitability, of course, are their low 
capabilities in production processes, as will be seen in the analysis of the capability scores 
below, which means that their productivity is too low or they are unable to meet the strict 
quality and delivery deadlines.  
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Besides very tight price policies of nearly all global retailers, the price issue seems to be 
a larger problem for European buyers that compare Ethiopia to other least developed 
countries from which they can source duty-free (including Bangladesh). For US buyers 
Ethiopian prices are more advantageous in this regard, as Asian supplier countries have 
to pay tariffs that are especially high for synthetic and polyester-rich apparel products (up 
to 32%). This is also an important reason why US workwear and sportswear buyers are 
sourcing from Ethiopia, as these products have a high synthetic and polyester content and 
hence preferential market access is more valuable. However, a challenge for a typical 
large US buyer is volume, as Ethiopian-owned firms are too small to provide the required 
volumes. This also explains why there are only a few and very specific US buyers 
sourcing from Ethiopian+owned firms.   
 
On the US side, most of the local apparel firms engage in CMT production for the same 
three US buyers: Cintas, Champro and Superior Uniform Group (SUG). Cintas and SUG 
are in workwear, selling polo shirts and uniforms such as scrubs and chef clothes. 
Champro does sportswear. These buyers source synthetic and polyester rich woven items 
from Ethiopia given the higher duty advantage compared to cotton products in the US 
market. These products are also quite standard and have longer delivery and lead times, 
as they are not part of increasingly shrinking fashion cycles. The owner of Champro has 
been in Ethiopia for a long time as he was part of the Peace Corps and worked for a NGO 
in Ethiopia. There seem to be very specific and also personal relations to Ethiopia that led 
Champro to advocate for getting Ethiopia into AGOA. Champro was one of the first 
international buyers in Ethiopia, and it started sourcing from one particular local firm 
before AGOA was signed. Today Champro sources from 3 Ethiopian-owned firms; two 
of them only work for Champro, while one has an additional US buyer. One supplier just 
started working with Champro, but the other two have long term stable relationships.  
 
Cintas also started sourcing from Ethiopia early on, but left in 2009 due to performance 
issues related to just-in-time production and shifted to China. Cintas came back, however, 
around 2014. Today it works with 2 Ethiopian-owned firms that have Cintas as their sole 
buyer, but relations have just started due to Cintas’ recent come back to Ethiopia. It wants 
higher volumes but existing suppliers face capacity constraints. In contrast to Champro, 
Cintas typically sources through a middleman via Hong Kong. SUG came later and now 
has 3 Ethiopian-owned firms that work with them. SUG also demands higher volumes 
and would prefer to work only with one supplier, but firms face capacity constraints.  
 
These three US buyers work with CMT suppliers, but SUG is currently helping one local 
firm to move into full package/FOB production.8 The are other buyers supplying the US 
market that source from Ethiopia. They include AGI Apparel, which is a Pakistani firm 
                                                            
8 Standard Textiles, a US workwear and made-up textiles company, also came to Ethiopia but left as it 
demanded full package production. 
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that serves as an intermediate buyer for the US market, and another intermediary buyer 
that sources for Leeds and also Trimark. Several local firms tried to produce for AGI, but 
it did not work due to late delivery times. Now only one of the local firms is producing 
for AGI on a FOB basis.  
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Table 2 Overview of Local Apparel Firms Exporting in June 2016 






Main products Main end markets Function in GVC 
A-FIRM 2009-10 Integrated made 
up  
70% Yarn, fabric, made up 
textiles: bed sheets, towel, 
duvet, pillow covers 
Italy and Switzerland 
(EU) 
FOB-textile (made-up) 
C-FIRM 2007 Integrated 
garment 
60-80% Knit: ladies tops, leggings, 
polo shirts; Woven: 
trousers 
US & EU, particularly 
UK and Germany 
FOB-textile, 
some CMT 
B-FIRM 2015 Integrated made 
up  
5% Yarn, greige fabric, made 




Italy (grey fabric), China 
(yarn) 
FOB-textile (made-up) 
J-FIRM 2005 (tbc) Integrated 
garment 
10-20% Polo shirts, t-shirts (80%); 
woven bed sheets (20%) 
US & EU, particularly 




E-FIRM 2011 Integrated 
garment 
20% T-shirts EU FOB, some with own 
textile 
I-FIRM 2008 subcontract, 
2014 direct export 
Garment 100% T-shirts, leggings, dresses US & EU FOB 
F-FIRM 2006 Garment 80% Sportswear: baseball pants, 
polo shirts 
US CMT 
G-FIRM 2000  
(before registered 
as KTF) 
Garment 100% Sportswear: baseball, 
basketball, US football, 
soccer tops and bottoms 
US CMT 
K-FIRM 2003 subcontract, 
2010 direct export 
Garment 70% Chefwear US CMT 
N-FIRM 2007 subcontract,  
2015 direct export 
Garment 40-50% Basketball pants US CMT 
L-FIRM 2007 Garment 60% Polo shirts US CMT 
M-FIRM 2016 Garment 10% Healthcare uniforms US CMT 
D-FIRM 2008 textile, 
subcontract, 
2013 direct export 
Garment 80-90% T-shirts, polo shirts US & EU CMT (US), 
FOB (EU) 
H-FIRM 2014 Garment 30% Sportswear shorts; 
t-shirts, jackets, blouses
US & UK CMT (UK), 
FOB (US) 
Source: Compiled by authors from firm survey data.
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Measuring technological capabilities of Ethiopian-owned exporting apparel firms 
The questionnaire administered to the 14 local exporting firms aimed to capture 
information on the categories of capabilities of the apparel sector technological 
capabilities matrix in order to assess local firms’ capabilities. We have scored these firms 
on the function they perform within the apparel GVC as well as on indicators of four 
categories of capabilities: product, production process, end-market and linkages. We 
omitted the investment category in the scoring exercise because the firms gave very 
similar responses to the indicators of investment capabilities used in the questionnaire, 
but their responses are discussed in the next section, which provides a broader analysis of 
the firms’ technological capability scores. In the scoring exercise, we also took end-
market out of linkages and made it a separate scoring category, and also gave product and 
production process equal weight. The technological capabilities required in the apparel 
GVC vary depending on the specific function within the global value chain that local 
firms are providing; hence, we gave function a separate score.   
Of the many indicators we included in the matrix and the questionnaire, we selected only 
a few indicators for the scoring exercise, in order to make it effective and comparable 
among the firms. The selection of indicators was based on two factors: relevance of 
indicators to capture specific capabilities and availability of consistent data on indicators 
in the firm survey. Hence, some indicators could not be included in the scoring exercise 
because of limited availability of comparable data across all of the surveyed firms.  
The selected indicators for product, production process, end-market and linkages 
categories include both quantitative and qualitative survey questions. In this way, 
indicators are not biased towards what can be counted. For qualitative questions, the firm 
is scored based on a subjective assessment of the firm’s performance using the answers 
provided by the interviewee. Where possible, the direct response of the interviewee is 
used but crosschecked with other responses in the questionnaire to confirm the validity. 
Furthermore, we tried to balance indicators that measure quantity with indicators that 
measure quality within each category of capabilities. This is most important for the 
product and end market categories. For end market capabilities, the number of buyers is 
a quantity-related indicator that is combined with stability of buyer relationships in order 
to also capture the quality or depth of these relationships. For product capabilities, the 
variety of products is a quantity-related indicator that is combined with complexity of 
products.  
Table 3 presents the technological capabilities scores of the 14 local exporting firms. 
Given that there are at least two indicators for each of the four categories of capabilities, 
we made a sum score for each category, which is then turned into a low, medium or high 
assessment. We created an aggregate score for overall technological capabilities, but 
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present it in two ways in order to present an overall assessment as well as to keep the 
emphasis on the individual components and show variation across the capabilities within 
a given firm. Therefore, the two final columns in Table 3 present the aggregate score first 
as a list of low, medium or high on function, product, production, end-market and linkages 
capabilities, and then as an overall score of low, low-medium, medium or mixed (where 
the scores fluctuate significantly across capabilities). We did not analyze the data in a 
way that presents an overall numerical composite score, because it is more useful to keep 
the individual sum scores, as they indicate more about a firm’s capability building. The 
exact method of scoring is explained below in the context of each indicator used in 
scoring. A summary of the scoring method on each indicator is contained in Box 1. Note 
that in Tables 2 and 3, the names of the firms have been anonymized.  
Function 
We scored the firms based on the functions that are carried out by firms in Ethiopia, and 
this means CMT, FOB and FOB-textile. We included CMT-subcontracting in the scoring 
scale, such that CMT-subcontracting scores 1, CMT scores 2, FOB scores 3 and FOB-
textile scores 4. Some local firms carry out more than one function, as indicated in Table 
2. Therefore, we scored a firm based on the dominant function. If a firm carries out two
or more functions of equal importance, the scores were averaged, resulting in a score less
than a whole integer. In the overall score on function, we assessed scores of 1 or 2 as low,
since there were no local firms that are engaged purely in sub-contracting and thus no
reason to differentiate in the scoring; a score of 3 is medium; and a score of 4 is high.
Product 
Product capabilities capture the complexity of products, the variety of products, fulfilling 
volume requirements, and dealing with volume flexibility. For firms with direct buyer 
relationships and particularly FOB firms, it also includes pattern/sample making based 
on buyers’ design and specifications and fulfilling sampling lead times. We chose two 
indicators: complexity of main product and variety of products. Fulfilling volume 
requirements and dealing with volume flexibility is partly captured through these two 
indicators; the latter particularly in being able to produce different types of products as 
well as for different buyers and end markets with different volume requirements (see 
below). We did not include an indicator measuring pattern/sample making-related 
capabilities, as this is strongly linked to different functions that firms pursue in apparel 
GVCs and hence is already captured in the indicator on function. 
Product Indicator 1: Complexity of products. The main products of local firms were 
assessed as basic, intermediate or complex. Basic products include made-up textiles, t-
shirts, tank tops, leggings, trousers, chef wear, and healthcare uniforms. Intermediate 
products may include polo shirts, sportswear bottoms and tops, ladies tops and blouses, 
and jackets depending on unit prices. None of the local firms surveyed were producing 
complex products. Importantly, the type of product alone cannot be directly related to 
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complexity as there can be, for example, polo shirts that are simple and polo shirts that 
are intermediate. Thus, the assessment required triangulating type of products with unit 
prices and wherever possible also being able to see the actual products during the 
interview. We took what firms reported in the survey as the complexity of their main 
product or products, and then checked it against what they reported as their main 
product(s) as well as the average unit price of the main product(s). In some cases, we 
changed the scoring to reflect the outcome of this triangulation. If firms exported more 
than one main product, we did the scoring for each of them and then calculated the 
average score.  
 
Product Indicator 2: Variety of products. The number of different products that a firm 
exports is assumed to indicate a firm’s ability in dealing with more types of products, 
which requires specific knowledge about each product and skills to manage different 
product requirements at the same time. This is also linked to buyers’ preference for firms 
that can produce a variety of products, because it would allow the buyer to source 
different products from one firm. This argument is not that relevant in countries where 
many firms are readily available to supply different types of products, but in Ethiopia 
where there are few firms, it is important. If a buyer has established satisfactory 
relationships with a supplier firm, it often aims for sourcing more products from the same 
firm. In these cases, being able to supply a variety of products ensures stability in buyer 
relationships. Product variety also reduces risk, as the supplier firm does not put all its 
effort into one product and finding buyers for only this product. Hence, it gives supplier 
firms more flexibility and involves less risk.  
 
There is no global industry standard on variety of products, so we ranked the variety of 
products according to the survey replies of local firms, where five export products were 
the highest number given by any firm. Very similar products were counted as one product. 
The step from one to two products is particularly important as this requires already 
managing different requirements. Therefore, we assessed firms with only 1 export 
product as low, 2 or 3 export products as medium, and 4 or 5 export products as high. We 
did not differentiate between woven and knit products but only in product types, which 
may involve variation between or among knit and woven products. This is because we do 
not see production of knit and woven products as more relevant for product variety than 
different types of products (within knit or woven) from a capability and competitiveness 
point of view.  
 
Production process 
Production capabilities capture controlling production costs, quality, reliability and 
flexibility, labor productivity and training, and compliance with safety, labor and 
environmental standards. Our four indicators capture this: labor productivity (costs), not 
on time delivery (reliability), internal reject rate (quality) and certificates (fulfilling 
standards). We do not directly cover working capital or inventories, lead or throughput 
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time, labor turnover and absenteeism rates, and training expenditure for reasons explained 
below. Investing in new products and processes is crucial and can be seen in R&D 
expenditures, but none of the local firms in the survey indicated that they spend on R&D. 
Working capital or inventory (inputs, work in progress, finished goods) is an important 
proxy for cost control at manufacturers. For CMT firms that are not in charge of input 
sourcing, only work in progress inventory is important. Most of the local firms in the 
survey did not know what their inventory levels were, which already says something 
about their capabilities related to cost control, and gave rather ad hoc estimates. 
Furthermore, inventory levels are not comparable across CMT and FOB firms, so we did 
not include inventory as an indicator for production process capabilities.  
Lead time captures the speed at which a firm accepts a customer order and converts this 
to a delivered product. This includes lead times outside the production process (e.g. such 
as design and product development, inputs production, input transport, final product 
transport) and the manufacturing throughput time. The responses on lead time outside of 
production were very consistent among the local firms surveyed that engaged in FOB 
(and thus were in charge of input sourcing), while responses on throughput time varied 
across the firms or was often not known. It is difficult to compare throughput time as this 
depends on many factors, most importantly type of product and productivity. Therefore, 
throughput time is partly captured in our labor productivity measure as well as the not on 
time delivery indicator. Furthermore, the issue of lead time is quite different for FOB 
firms, which struggle with issues related to external conditions that increase lead times, 
compared to CMT firms that are not responsible for lead time outside of production.  
Labor turnover and absenteeism rates as well as training expenditures are also not directly 
included in the scoring. The effective use of human resources is important for all 
dimensions of competitiveness. First, if human resources are managed effectively, 
generating worker commitment and stability, it can be seen in low labor turnover and 
absenteeism rates. However, data on labor turnover was very similar among most local 
firms. Reported rates of labor turnover were generally high among all firms, indicating 
that it is an industry-wide problem. It is a general country problem arising in the early 
stages of industrialization in a largely agrarian economy, in which a working class 
accustomed to the rhythm and tasks of jobs in factories is in the process of being formed.9 
According to survey responses, managers indicated that workers will leave one factory 
for another in response to small improvements in wages and working conditions. There 
is also an important correlation between labor turnover and labor productivity, as 
managing labor turnover is an important prerequisite to increasing productivity. Many 
survey respondents noted that they could raise their productivity level, but then labor 
turnover resulted in falling levels of productivity and starting over with training new 
9 The fact that working classes have to be formed is often overlooked in more technical economic 
analyses, but is an essential process in capitalist economic transformation. The best scholarship 
making this point in relation to the origin of industrial capitalism in Great Britain is E.P. Thompson’s 
The making of the English working class (London: Penguin Books, 1980). 
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employees. 
Second, if human resources are developed by investing in employees, it can be seen in 
training expenditures. However, local firms could not report their expenditure on training 
in the same way, if at all, which made it difficult to get reliable and comparable data 
among the surveyed firms. Local firms did provide training, but it was often on-the-job 
training focused on initial learning of basic operator skills, which was carried out in-house 
(and thus not counted as training expenditure), or firms sent their workers to TIDI for 
generally free of charge training. Local firms also used foreign experts with experience 
in the apparel global value chain, who came from important supplier countries such as 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Pakistan, to train their workers as well as middle management 
staff. These expatriates were initially funded through a scheme at TIDI with support from 
donor agencies, and continue to be funded by such schemes but also increasingly by the 
local firms themselves.  
In sum, labor turnover, absenteeism, and training expenditure all influence labor 
productivity, so we decided to take labor productivity as a key indicator. It is also 
relatively easier to capture comparable data on labor productivity, as most local firms had 
participated in a study with TIDI that measured their productivity, or knew their level of 
productivity against the international standard for other reasons. 
Production Indicator 1: Labor productivity. Labor productivity is measured in terms 
of how long it takes a firm to make its main product(s) in relation to the international 
standard, which is based on the standard allowed minute (SAM). The SAM of a product 
varies according to the work content or to number of operations, length of seams, fabric 
types, stitching accuracy needed, sewing technology to be used, and so on. The SAM is 
then compared to the time needed by an operator or a production line in a given firm.10 
Firms were scored using the international standard of benchmarking with China, where 
we defined low as below 60% of the international standard, medium as 60 to 75%, and 
high as above 75%. A problem with scoring productivity is that it varies considerably 
within firms as the result of low volumes, changing products and styles frequently, and 
changing buyers. Hence, we asked firms to provide an average. The two made-up textile 
firms did not have productivity data for their products, because they had not conducted 
time studies and benchmarking.  
Production Indicator 2: Not on time delivery to buyers. On time delivery captures the 
percentage of products delivered on-time and in-full to customers with no defects and 
10 For example, an operator was doing an operation of SAM 0.50 minutes. In an 8 hours shift day she 
produces 400 pieces. So according to the efficiency calculating formula, that operator’s overall efficiency 
is as follows (400 x 0.50) / (8 x 60)*100% = 200/480*100% = 41.67%. This calculation can be replicated 
for a whole production line and factory. See http://guidingmetrics.com/content/key-apparel-industry-
metrics/.   
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with the right documentation. On time delivery is a big issue for all local firms as the 
result of conditions in Ethiopia that are exogenous to the firms, such as access to inputs 
within the country, access to foreign exchange, distance to port, and options for 
transportation. Meeting the delivery deadlines set by buyers is a particularly large 
challenge for FOB firms that are in charge of and responsible for input sourcing, in 
contrast to CMT firms where buyers are responsible. FOB firms rely on access to foreign 
exchange with which to purchase inputs, reliable delivery of inputs and the quality of 
inputs supplied, in order to supply the finished products to buyers on time. Hence, all 
FOB firms scored worse on this indicator. If local firms are late on delivery, or later than 
a maximum amount of days past the delivery deadline that the buyer allows, then buyers 
generally reject the order and local firms lose the payment, and even lose the buyer. Not 
on time delivery was scored in terms of often, sometimes and hardly ever, and measured 
in terms of not on time deliveries as a percentage of all deliveries. Taking into account 
the global industry standards as well as the overall experience of the Ethiopian apparel 
industry, ‘often’ was defined as 5% and above, ‘sometimes’ as between 2 and 4%, and 
‘hardly ever’ as 1% and below. 
 
 
Production Indicator 3: Internal reject rate. There is a difference between customer 
return rates and internal reject, rework and scrap rates. Customer returns reveal quality 
satisfaction of buyers but offer an insufficient indication of internal quality performance. 
Firms may have poor internal production systems, but provide quality products by 
following stringent checks at the end of the processes; this system is costly. Firms need 
to reduce their internal reject rates in the final checking station in order to provide 
sustainable and efficient quality performance. Hence, the lower the internal reject rate is 
the better the firm’s ability in maximizing quality and efficiency. The internal reject rate 
was measured as the share of internally rejected products. These products can then be 
reworked, if possible, or scrapped. For scoring, we considered the global industry 
standards as well as the overall experience of the Ethiopian apparel industry. We scored 
a 5% and above reject rate as ‘often’ reject, between 2 and 4% as ‘sometimes’ reject, and 
1% and below as ‘hardly ever’ reject. 
 
Production Indicator 4: Certificates for standards. Certification indicates production 
processes or products that meet an international business standard. There are different 
certificates regarding quality management systems, labor and safety standards, and 
environmental standards. ISO 9001 is the most common certification for quality 
management systems, and it is administered by accreditation and certification bodies that 
conduct independent audits. Certification to these ISO standards does not guarantee any 
quality of end products; rather, it certifies that formalized processes are being applied. On 
the social compliance side, the most important certificates are WRAP for US buyers, and 
BSCI for EU buyers. Environmental compliance is only important for textile firms or 
vertically integrated firms. The most important ones include ISO 14001 (environmental 
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management systems) and Ecotex. Some global buyers have strict Codes of Conduct that 
are equivalent to international certificates. Therefore, for firms supplying these buyers, 
we also took into account these Codes of Conduct in the scoring. 
 
Certification is expensive; it involves paying for accreditation and annual maintenance of 
the certification, as well as paying for the services of a consultant to help the firm initially 
to meet the certification requirements. Therefore, the number of certificates that a firm 
has can be correlated with a firm’s financial position. Firms that have relatively easy 
access to finance are more likely to have certificates, and in some cases government or 
third party support (such as donor agency support funds) may help to finance the 
certification process. We scored a firm low if it had no certificates, medium if it had a 
quality management certificate (ISO 9000), and high if it had a quality management 




The end market capability category refers to the overall capabilities of firms to meet the 
specifications of buyers in different markets, their ability to establish stable relations with 
buyers, and their market knowledge and promotion skills. Hence, this category captures 
managing relationships with buyers (communication, account management, negotiations, 
audits), managing buyer and end market diversification, and market intelligence 
gathering. We focused on buyer relationships, including their numbers as well as the 
stability of the relationships.  
 
End market Indicator 1: Number and dominance of buyers. It is assumed that the 
higher the number of direct buyers that the firm has, the higher the capability of the firm. 
Having more buyers reduces risk, allows a better bargaining position, and shows that the 
firm is able to manage more buyer relationships. We scored a firm low if it depended on 
one buyer, medium if it depended on two buyers, and high if it had 3 or more buyers. If a 
firm had more buyers but depended largely on one or two buyers for most of its exports, 
then we scored this as 1 or 2 buyer(s) respectively. 
 
We did not include end markets as a separate indicator as this correlates with buyers. With 
the exception of one European buyer that also sells to the US (H&M), all other buyers 
and intermediaries sourcing from local firms sold either to the US or to the EU. Further, 
differences in these end markets and hence different sourcing requirements of related 
buyers exist for Ethiopian-owned firms but are not as pronounced as in other supplier 
countries (see Morris et al. 2016). This is the case because the typical large volume US 
buyers are not sourcing from Ethiopian-owned firms, but only a few US workwear and 
sportswear buyers that also accept lower volumes even though they complain about 
capacity constraints (see above). Volumes are, however, generally still larger for US 
buyers. In some other areas, there are differences between EU and US buyers, particularly 
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in terms of EU buyers being stricter in demanding FOB production with some US buyers 
even preferring CMT, as well as the use of different types of standards and certificates. 
Hence, serving different end markets requires firms to deal with buyers coming from 
different country backgrounds and related specifications and standards. Clearly, this does 
not apply to firms that supply one buyer that sells in both the US and EU, such as H&M, 
but rather for local firms having distinct buyers from different end markets. Another 
pragmatic reason for not including end markets as a separate indicator was the need to 
balance between quantity and quality indicators, in order to give the qualitative buyer 
stability indicator the same weight as the quantity-related measure. Having two quantity 
indicators would have downplayed the quality of the buyer relationships.  
End market Indicator 2: Stability of buyers. In the survey, firms were asked to rate 
their relations with their main direct buyers as stable, somewhat stable or ad-hoc. If they 
rated their relations as ‘stable’ or ‘somewhat stable’, then they were asked with how many 
of the buyers they worked for more than a year. We further asked if firms had lost buyers 
in the past, and if so, how many. Thus, we could cross-check what firms reported in the 
survey in terms of describing their relationships with buyers with what they reported as 
their main buyers and history with buyers. In some cases, we changed a firm’s scoring on 
buyer stability to reflect the outcome of this triangulation of responses. Hence, a 
subjective assessment was applied in reaching a final score of low (unstable/ad hoc), 
medium (somewhat stable), or high (stable). 
Linkages 
The linkages category captures links with other apparel firms (horizontal) and links with 
input suppliers and service providers (vertical), as well as relationships to important 
institutional actors such as the industry association (Ethiopian Textile and Garment 
Manufacturers Association, ETGAMA), the public agency responsible for the sector 
(Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute, TIDI), public universities providing 
industry-specific education or research and development, and other government provided 
services. We selected three indicators that match these three types of linkages – links with 
other apparel firms, links with input and service providers, and links with public sector 
institutions. The scoring on each of these indicators is based on several qualitative 
questions and the overall score is based on our subjective assessment. 
We included holding executive positions at ETGAMA in the indicator on links with 
public sector institutions rather than in the indicator on links with other apparel firms, 
because we cannot assume that having executive positions at the industry association 
necessarily means stronger links with other firms. In least developed countries, the 
primary role of industry associations initially is to engage with government officials and 
civil servants, and not to increase linkages between firms through sharing knowledge, 
collective marketing schemes and so on. This was also shown through the survey 
responses regarding the benefits for their firm of being a member of ETGAMA and 
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through additional information collected from interviews that revealed that the purpose 
of ETGAMA is largely to have a collective voice in discussions with the government and 
donor agencies, or other third party support. It is strong in this regard, but weak in terms 
of creating linkages among firms.  
 
Linkages Indicator 1: Links with other apparel firms. This indicator assesses direct 
interaction and cooperation between a local firm and other local and foreign apparel firms 
(including subcontracting relations) as well as participation in collaborative schemes. 
Four questions in the survey were used to score a firm on this indicator. First, firms were 
asked about their principal sources of information and given a list of possible answers, 
which included local firms and foreign firms as choices. Second, firms were asked if they 
participated in any kinds of collaborative schemes (formal or informal) with other firms. 
If they said yes, then firms were asked to list the type of activities or schemes in which 
they participated. Third, firms were asked how often they sought knowledge or advice 
from other firms (not very often, sometimes, very often). Fourth, we asked firms if they 
sub-contract a part of their production to other firms, and also whether they did any sub-
contracting for other firms. Based on the survey responses, we made a subjective 
assessment as to whether a firm had low, medium or high links with other apparel firms.  
 
Linkages Indicator 2: Links with input and service suppliers. This indicator assesses 
the relationships firms have with local input suppliers including direct raw material inputs 
such as fabric and yarn, trim and accessories (such as buttons, zippers, thread, elastic, 
labels, hangers), and capital equipment and machinery parts, as well as non-essential 
inputs such as packaging. The last category also includes broad services applicable to a 
range of industries such as transportation, logistics, catering, IT, construction, cleaning, 
security, human resource and training. Such linkages are important as they show that 
firms have relationships along the value chain and capabilities to engage and deal with 
the different providers required for apparel production.  
 
Clearly, this indicator depends importantly on if such input and service providers exist at 
all in Ethiopia, which is limited in some areas, and also if firms are CMT or FOB 
suppliers, and in the case of the latter, to what extent the buyers stipulate the input 
suppliers that firms have to use. For CMT firms, all of the inputs are sourced by the buyer, 
generally from abroad, and sent to the supplier firm. For FOB firms, we asked from where 
they sourced inputs and whether their buyers nominated input suppliers. We also asked 
what percentage of their inputs were sourced locally, which types of inputs, and whether 
this could be extended or not. For FOB-textile firms, we asked where they sourced their 
yarn, if they did not have spinning facilities, and if they did, what percentage of cotton 
was sourced locally. For all firms, we asked whether firms purchased business services 
or support services such as embroidery, printing and dyeing or whether they provided 
such services in-house. We also asked about their relations with transport and logistics 
service providers. Based on the survey responses, we made a subjective assessment as to 
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whether a firm had low, medium or high links with local input and service suppliers. 
 
Linkages Indicator 3: Links with public sector institutions.  This indicator assesses a 
firm’s capabilities to link and interact with public sector institutions, which is relevant for 
the sustainability of firms in terms being able to react to policy changes or influence 
policies and being able to access and take advantage of various public support programs. 
This also captures how pro-actively and strategically firms use support programs to 
improve their performance and ensure learning and capability building. But it also shows 
how effective and useful firms see the activities of the government in terms of furthering 
the sector and how these interventions could be improved.    
 
We asked several questions related to public sector linkages. First, we asked if the firm 
had relationships with any public-sector institutions, and if so, to list which ones and to 
indicate how strong the links were. We also asked if the government provided support 
services to the textile and apparel industry, and if so to list the services and to indicate 
whether the firm had participated in and benefited from those services. We further 
specifically asked whether the firm interacted with any education or public research 
institute. Finally, we asked about the firm’s ability to access investment and working 
capital, and if it had accessed such finance through state-owned banks at special rates. 
More generally, we asked about publicly provided services such as customs clearance, 
and we asked about the firm’s access to foreign exchange, given that the foreign exchange 
market is not liberalized in Ethiopia. The responses to these questions provided broader 
insight into government-business relations, and whether firms were actively engaged in 
discussions with the government to improve public institutions and regulations that 
influence firms’ performance. As discussed above, we also included in the scoring for 
this indicator if firms held executive positions at ETGAMA. Based on the survey 
responses, we made a subjective assessment as to whether a firm had low, medium or 
high links with public sector institutions. 
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Table 3 Ethiopian-owned Apparel Firms Technological Capabilities Scores 
Firm Functi
on 





























































A-FIRM 3.5   H 1 1 2 L 2 1 2 3 8 M 3 3 6 H 2 2 3 7  M HLMHM MIXED 
B-FIRM 3.5  H 1 1 2 L X X X 3 X11 L 1 2 3  L 1 2 3 6  M HLLLM MIXED 
C-FIRM 3.5  H 1.5 3 4.5 M 2 1 2 3 8 M 3 3 6  H 1 2 3 6  M HMMHM MED 
D-FIRM 2.5  M 1.5 2 4 M 2 3 2 2 9  M 3 3 6  H 2 1 2 5  L MMMHL MED 
E-FIRM 3.5  H 1 1 2 L 1 2 2 2 7 M 2 2 4  M 2 2 2 6  M HLMMM MED 
F-FIRM 2  L 2 2 4 M 2 2 2 1 712 M 1 3 4 M 1 1 2 4  L LMMML MED-
LOW 
G-FIRM 2  L 2 2 4 M 2 2 2 1 7 M 1 3 4  M 1 1 2 4  L LMMML MED-
LOW 
H-FIRM 2.5  M 2 3 5 M 1 1 1 1 4 L 2 3 5  M 1 1 2 4  L MMLML MED-
LOW 
I-FIRM 3  M 1 2 3 L 1 2 2 2 7 M 1 2 3 L 1 2 2 5  L MLMLL LOW 
J-FIRM 3  M 1 2 3 L 1 1 1 3 6 L 2 1 3  L 1 2 2 5  L MLLLL LOW 
K-FIRM 2  L 1 1.5 2.5 L 1 3 1 3 8 M 1 2 3  L 1 1 2 4  L LLMLL LOW 
L-FIRM 2  L 1.5 1 2.5 L 1 3 1 2 7 M 1 1 2  L 2 1 2 5  L LLMLL LOW 
M-FIRM 2  L 1 1 2 L 1 X 2 2 6-8
L/M
1 1 2  L 1 1 2 4  L LLLLL/ 
LLMLL 
LOW 
N-FIRM 2  L 2 1 2.5 L 1 X 1 1 4-6 L 1 1 2  L 1 1 2 4  L LLLLL LOW 
11 We lacked survey responses on production. Based on the information we know about this firm, we made an assessment. 
12 Production scores for this firm were slightly adapted from interview answers to include our own assessment. Not on time delivery scores were uncertain as 
inconsistent with other firms’ reported figures. 
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Box 1: Key for Scoring of Indicators of Technological Capabilities 
Functions: CMT-Subcontracting=1, CMT=2, FOB=3, FOB-Textile (meaning with own 
fabric)=4.     
Low= 1-2, Medium= 3, High= 4.  
Complexity of products: Basic=1, Intermediate= 2, Complex=3. 
Variety of products: Low (1 product)= 1, Medium (2 or 3 products)= 2, High (4 to 5 
products)= 3. 
Labor productivity: Low (below 60%)= 1, Medium (60 to 75%)= 2, High (above 
75%)= 3. 
Not on time delivery: Often (5% and above)=1, Sometimes (between 2 and 4%)= 2, 
Hardly ever (1% and below)= 3.  
Internal reject rate: Often (5% and above)=1, Sometimes (between 2 and 4%)= 2, 
Hardly ever (1% and below)= 3.  
Certificates: Low (no certificates)=1, Medium (1 certificate)= 2, High (2 certificates 
and more)= 3. 
Number and dominance of buyers: Low (dependent on 1 buyer)= 1, Medium 
(dependent on 2 buyers)= 2, High (3 or more buyers)= 3.  
Stability of buyers: Low (unstable/ad hoc)= 1, Medium (somewhat stable)= 2, High 
(stable)= 3. 
Links with other apparel firms: Low= 1, Medium= 2, High= 3.  
Links with local input/service suppliers: Low= 1, Medium= 2, High= 3. 
Links with public sector institutions: Low= 1, Medium= 2, High= 3.  
*Sum Score key for Product and End-Market: Low= 2-3, Medium= 4-5, High= 6.
**Sum Score key for Production: Low= 4-6, Medium= 7-9, High= 10-12. 
***Sum Score key for Linkages: Low= 3-5, Medium= 6-7, High= 8-9. 
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Analyzing the capabilities of Ethiopian-owned firms 
 
The technological capabilities scores of the 14 local exporting firms presented in Table 3 
show that a majority of the firms have low capabilities. A-Firm and B-Firm have mixed 
scores, which results from their score on function as FOB-textile and thus High, but they 
only produce made-up textiles, such as bedsheets and towels, and their scores on other 
capabilities are also lower. Notably, there is significant variation in the production and 
end-market capabilities between the two firms, which is likely due to the fact that B-Firm 
only just began trying to export made-up textiles while A-firm has exported since 2009. 
 
Of the 12 other firms, 50% score an overall Low, 25% score Medium-Low and the 
remaining 25% score Medium. Two out of three of the firms that scored an overall 
Medium are vertically integrated firms producing apparel on a FOB basis, some of which 
are produced with their own fabric. However, being vertically integrated did not ensure 
higher scores on other capabilities. The third firm scoring Medium is engaged in both 
CMT and FOB but scored comparatively high on most other capabilities. Of the three 
firms that scored Medium-Low, one is engaged in both CMT and FOB. The other two 
Medium-Low firms are CMT firms, which have built higher capabilities than the other 
four CMT firms that scored an overall Low. I-Firm and J-Firm, the other two firms with 
an overall Low score, were engaged in FOB, but struggle more than the other FOB firms 
to build the capabilities required for that function. It is useful to analyze the performance 
of the local firms in each category of capabilities, before discussing some of the overall 
findings regarding firms’ capabilities based on the survey results. To interpret these 
findings it is also important to identify different firm trajectories, which is done below.  
 
Let us start with investment capabilities, which were not presented in the scoring due to 
lack of variation but which are very indicative about the firms’ trajectories in learning 
and the evolution of the export apparel industry. The survey questions focused on initial 
investment capabilities, and thus do not capture much about later investments, which 
many firms were undertaking at the time of the survey. Six of the local firms in the survey 
were among the firms that benefited from the government’s industrial policy in the mid-
2000s to support local investors to enter apparel exports through investment loans from 
the Development Bank of Ethiopia (see Staritz and Whitfield 2017b). The survey revealed 
that none of them had previous experience in managing a factory or in textile and apparel 
production in particular. From interviews with other firms that benefited from these DBE 
loans, but were not among the exporting firms at the time of the survey, this statement 
applies generally to all of the local firms that received loans in the mid-2000s. Most of 
these early local export-oriented investors did a feasibility study, as it was required for 
the DBE loan, but it turns out that the feasibility studies were all written by the same local 
consultancy firm, were basically the same, and thus all misunderstood the availability of 
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local inputs and the nature of the apparel global value chain.13 As a result, these firms 
were not prepared for what was required, and neither was the DBE or the Ministry of 
Industry, which we think explains why a large portion of the early investors did not 
survive. The firms that survived did so because they built relations with one buyer early 
on and maintained that relationship, often offering sub-contracting opportunities to other 
local firms. 
 
None of the other firms had carried out a feasibility study prior to investment. The state-
owned vertically integrated textile firms had accumulated experience in the sector, but 
mostly in textile production, and Almeda (EFFORT firm) was established in the latter 
half of the 1990s primarily as a textile firm and only later increased the apparel 
component. The remaining firms entered apparel exports either by sub-contracting for 
existing local firms or Ayka Addis, the first and largest foreign (Turkish) firm exporting 
apparel, or using knowledge built up through producing apparel for the domestic market. 
For example, D-Firm and E-Firm started in apparel through sub-contracting, while H-
Firm drew on its experience in the domestic market.  
 
All initial local investors had problems with accessing managerial expertise and skilled 
labor in the apparel export sector, as none existed in Ethiopia at that time. Only after 2010, 
with the establishment of TIDI, the government agency in the sector, did local firms began 
to use expatriate staff to share knowledge and train workers, through schemes that 
subsidized the cost of bringing foreign experts from abroad. Since then, TIDI has also 
offered training for new workers that many firms have used.  
 
In terms of product capabilities, most of the firms produce basic products or intermediary 
products that are more sophisticated versions of the basic products they produce, such as 
polo shirts and sportswear. Only H-Firm produces intermediate products such as women’s 
blouses and outdoor jackets, which results from the type of products demanded by one of 
the firm’s buyers. In general, firms’ buyers determine what they produce, and thus 
variation in complexity is explained by variation in buyers. However, firms that have been 
producing basic products successfully for the same buyer for several years are often asked 
to begin producing more complex products gradually. Some had challenges in fulfilling 
these requests as producing more complex products led to low productivity and these 
firms hence prefer to focus on a few basic products. Half of the firms specialize in one 
type of product, while the other half of the firms have diversified into two or more types 
of products. The variety of products is not related to whether a firm is producing basic or 
intermediate products, but again largely determined by the buyers’ demands and by the 
number of buyers. In the case of E-Firm, however, it is determined by the firm’s strategy 
                                                            
13 The feasibility studies by the local consultancy assumed that the fabric produced by local textile mills 
was good for exports, and more generally that raw material inputs were available locally. Thus, the local 
investors did not realize that they would have to import all inputs for export apparel production, and few 
seem to have understood the nature of CMT and FOB production. 
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to specialize in t-shirts produced with its own fabric and thus the firm recently shifted to 
buyers whose demands fit with their strategy. 
 
In terms of production capabilities, all firms struggle with labor productivity due to high 
labor turnover, as discussed earlier, but also due to the limited supply of local experienced 
managers and supervisors, lack of sophisticated systems to incentivize increased worker 
productivity, and poor monitoring and supervision. Firms were in the process of applying 
for certifications which would help improve management systems (ISO) and safety 
(BSCI/WRAP), but certification does not necessarily mean high productivity, as indicated 
by J-Firm and K-Firm, which have many certificates but struggle with labor and 
management systems. In the absence of local managers with experience in the sector, this 
experience has to be imported by hiring expatriates. The expatriates are needed not only 
to improve the production, management and labor systems, but also to share how they do 
what they do (their tacit knowledge) with local management and supervision staff. 
Despite generally low labor productivity across the firms, there is some variation, which 
is not due to geographic location, but rather to different supervision and performance 
incentive schemes, indicating that some firms have learned and put in place better systems 
than other firms. The four apparel firms with medium labor productivity were better able 
to manage labor turnover and had labor retention strategies in place; however, of these 
four firms, the scores of two of them were at the lower end of the spectrum, indicating 
that they were still struggling.  
 
The performance on internal reject rate is better than on labor productivity, with more 
firms scoring medium than low. In general, the quality of the products has improved, but 
the speed at which products are produced is slow relative to international standards. 
Productivity is important for competitiveness and profitability, especially for CMT firms, 
where the labor-intensive assembly process is the only place where efficiency gains can 
be made. Low labor productivity does not seem to affect not on time delivery, which is 
not much of an issue for CMT firms but a major constraint facing FOB firms, which have 
lost buyers or had orders rejected due to missing the delivery date. Not on time delivery 
for FOB firms is primarily a function of delays in accessing foreign exchange with which 
to buy inputs, inexperience and lack of trust relations with input suppliers abroad, and 
slow and unreliable transport and logistics systems. Recently the Development Bank of 
Ethiopia created new financial instruments for local exporting firms in an attempt to solve 
the problem of slow access to foreign exchange for importing inputs for export orders, 
which hopefully will solve part of the problem. But the other half of the problem remains 
the absence of input sourcing experience within the FOB firms and the need to build up 
relations with input suppliers abroad (as long as there are no local input providers) in 
terms of availability, quality, price and delivery time. There is a shortage of locals with 
export merchandising experience, although there are now some degrees in export 
merchandising offered in Ethiopian universities. Therefore, local firms have to hire 
expatriates to transfer this knowledge to local staff, as well as use those expatriates’ 
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existing networks and contacts with input supplier firms in China, India and Pakistan. In 
general, the firms that scored an overall Low on production capabilities do not have 
enough management level staff, and sometimes owners try to run everything. 
 
Local firms’ end market capabilities, which also include marketing capabilities since the 
indicators focus on number of buyers and stability of buyers, vary considerably. Half of 
the firms scored Low, while the other half scored Medium or High. Six out of seven of 
the local firms that scored Low on end market capabilities did so because they were 
dependent on one buyer and had unstable or only somewhat stable relationships with this 
buyer. The outlier firm, J-Firm, scored Low because although it had more than one buyer, 
it had very unstable buyer relationships due to its inability to deliver on time and meet 
quality parameters. Of the four firms that scored Medium in end market capabilities, two 
firms, F-Firm and G-Firm, have only one buyer, but scored Medium due to their long 
stability with this buyer. The other two firms, E-Firm and H-Firm, had two buyers and 
stable or somewhat stable relationships. Three firms scored High as they had two or more 
buyers as well as stable relationships with these buyers. The six local firms that had stable 
relationships with buyers generally had quite specific buyers. They had either one US 
sportswear buyer who has been in Ethiopia for a long time or an US workwear buyer. 
These buyers accept lower volumes, have comparatively low delivery time standards and 
tend to help suppliers to meet their requirements and standards. The same is true for 
another US workwear buyer; however, relationships with local firms are only somewhat 
stable or unstable, which is probably related to the only recent come back of this firm to 
Ethiopia. The other firms with stable relationships had five EU retail buyers that seem to 
be more attached to Ethiopia as a sourcing location. However, the most prominent of 
these retailers, which also has opened a sourcing office in Addis Ababa, has struggled to 
find and develop suitable local suppliers and stopped relationships with one of its local 
firm suppliers after we conducted the survey.  
 
In terms of linkages capabilities, the local firms generally perform poorly, with 10 firms 
scoring Low and 4 firms scoring Medium. Of the 4 firms that scored Medium, 3 did so 
because they had high links with public sector institutions as a result of being a state-
owned firm or being the current chairman of ETGAMA. The fourth firm scored Medium 
due to medium scores on all three indicators, including linkages with other firms, where 
most firms scored low.  
 
In general, there were limited linkages among local firms, and between local and foreign 
firms. Survey responses indicated that ETGAMA, the industry association, was good at 
lobbying and liaising with the government, but no respondent mentioned that they used it 
as a platform for sharing and working together. Some respondents explicitly said that the 
industry association was limited in this regard and that local firms were not working 
together. Based on survey responses, we could see that there were small groups of local 
firms that have closer relations to each other, and that these groups had emerged from 
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earlier relations where existing local firms helped new firms learn as they entered the 
industry. Respondents mentioned limited links with foreign firms, and when foreign firms 
were mentioned, it was mostly as suppliers of yarn or fabric. The Turkish firm Ayka 
Addis was the only firm mentioned in terms of sub-contracting to local firms. However, 
foreign firms in apparel exports entered Ethiopia only recently, especially with the 
establishment of the Bole Lemi industrial park that opened in 2015/16 and several others 
industrial parks opening in 2017 and 2018 (see Staritz and Whitfield 2017b). Hence, there 
may be more opportunities for subcontracting in the future, but the business model of 
transnational producers that dominate recent foreign investments and their global 
production and sourcing networks makes this also questionable. ETGAMA cannot 
facilitate linkages between local firms and foreign firms, because foreign firms are not 
members of the association. 
 
Local firms also showed limited linkages with local suppliers. This is predominantly 
because there are not many local suppliers of export quality fabrics, trims and accessories. 
The firms that scored Medium on this indicator where typically vertically integrated firms 
that sourced cotton or yarn locally, although I-Firm was able to source some export 
quality fabric locally through relations developed with Ayka Addis. 
 
Linkages with public institutions were generally Medium, because all local firms interact 
with and benefit from the services provided by TIDI and the Development Bank of 
Ethiopia. For example, all of the firms responded that they benefited from the TIDI 
scheme offering financial support to hire expatriates, and probably found it to be the most 
useful service currently offered. Some respondents mentioned that the government 
subsidized the cost of getting ISO certification and the cost of participation in 
international trade fairs. In addition, many respondents mentioned that they had accessed 
their initial buyer and/or current buyers through the Ministry of Industry, which had given 
their contacts to prospective buyers. Furthermore, the executive members of ETGAMA 
play an active role in liaising with TIDI, DBE and government officials in the Ministry 
of Industry, and have been instrumental in developing solutions to challenges that 
exporting firms face that result from factors exogenous to the firms, such as import duty 
schemes, letters of credit and foreign exchange access.  
 
However, most respondents mentioned that TIDI and DBE are still learning, themselves, 
about the sector. Therefore, although TIDI offers good services and has state-of-art 
facilities for training, it is not making the most of these services because it has limited 
knowledge. For example, TIDI arranges expatriates for the local firms, but does not 
necessarily get good ones because TIDI staff do not know what qualities to look for in 
applications. As a result, many local firms are now undertaking this process themselves: 
finding and hiring expatriates to come to Ethiopia, but it is expensive and time consuming. 
In other words, some local firms have ‘outgrown’ TIDI, whose services no longer meet 
their needs and thus reached the limits to which they can benefit from strong linkages. 
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Additionally, many respondents commented that DBE staff do not understand the apparel 
and textile sector, and thus do not understand and evaluate their proposals for investment 
and expansion financing fairly and quickly. This could also be the result of DBE taking a 
more cautious stance on investment in the sector due to the outstanding debts of the initial 
local investors, which for many of them had to be rescheduled due to poor performance 
in the first five years. In sum, linkages to public institutions such as TIDI and DBE have 
been important in achieving changes in policy and financial instruments, but there is a 
limit to learning that can result from these linkages if these public institutions are not also 
learning at the same time.  
 
Most local firms have linkages with public education facilities, most importantly Bahir 
Dar University and the vocational training schools. Graduates from Bahir Dar University 
were present in most firms at the management level, even though there are complaints 
about their training not being practical enough.  The biggest issues were mentioned with 
regard to vocational schools, which were criticized for using outdated machines and 
technologies and hence producing graduates that did not have the skills required for 
working in export production.  
 
There is a trend towards vertical integration, at least for local firms that aim to move to 
FOB production and particularly for firms that already have knitting facilities that 
produce fabric used in apparel sold on the domestic market, but need to invest in better 
machines in order to produce knitted fabric of export quality. Vertical integration seems 
to help local firms survive and become competitive, especially in the context of Ethiopia 
where factors exogenous to the firms result in delays to receive inputs, combined with 
firms’ lack of experience and relations with input suppliers in Asian countries. For some 
firms it seems easier to produce their own knit fabric for t-shirts and polo shirts, especially 
given the history of textile production in the country and thus the presence of experts in 
textile production and machinery, than to build up the capabilities required to source 
inputs from all over the world and being dependent on long and unreliable lead times 
related to local transportation and logistics infrastructure. Global input sourcing 
capabilities include having large orders and thus importing high enough volumes to be 
able to negotiate on price; putting in place systems to meticulously check the quality of 
inputs and build a reputation with input suppliers so that they do not send poor quality 
fabric and accessories; and linking input sourcing with skills in export merchandising. 
Because many Ethiopian-owned firms are producing basic products, the option of 
producing pure cotton products using their own textiles is feasible, particularly in the EU 
market where exports are concentrated in knit products. Given that there are currently 
only a few local firms with spinning and knitting facilities, they can access cotton locally 
and import when necessary. Firms with only knitting facilities are able to buy cotton yarn 
from other local spinning and textile companies. The US market prefers fabric made from 
cotton-polyester blends or pure polyester, which makes vertical integration more difficult 
given the unavailability of polyester fiber and textiles in Ethiopia. But some local firms 
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that want to broaden their market opportunities also with US buyers are investing in 
facilities that can handle such blends, and import polyester yarn.  
 
To interpret the capabilities of local firms and understand their development and related 
challenges, it makes sense to identify certain trajectories among Ethiopian-owned firms. 
Based on the overall survey results and the broader picture of the apparel sector in 
Ethiopia presented in this paper and in Staritz and Whitfield (2017b), we identified four 
trajectories among local firms. 
The first trajectory includes firms that started in textile production for the domestic 
market, are vertically integrated and produce now for the domestic market and export 
markets. This includes the two remaining state-owned firms, one privatised state-owned 
firm that was in textile production, and the firms that are a part of MIDROC and EFFORT 
diversified business groups. The second trajectory includes apparel firms that started 
producing for the domestic market and then shifted into exporting, or are in the process 
of shifting and trying to export. This shift was motivated by government incentives, 
access to foreign exchange and/or 'to learn' through export production. However, most of 
these firms remain focused on the domestic market. The third trajectory includes firms 
that started out exporting apparel, although most of them also produce for the domestic 
market. These firms are still more oriented to the export market. This trajectory can be 
divided into CMT and FOB firms. The former focus on process improvements and some 
also on increasing product complexity while remaining CMT suppliers, and the latter 
focus on upgrading to FOB or improving competitiveness in FOB with most also aiming 
to upgrade to FOB-textile. Hence, FOB firms generally are already pursuing vertical 
integration or aim for vertical integration into textile in the future.  The fourth category 
includes firms that started exporting apparel but left the export market and began 
producing for the domestic market. Some of these firms still aim to export in the future, 
while others remain focused on the domestic market. Hence, this is the category of firms 
that failed to export. Even though these firms are not part of the survey scoring, we still 
identify this group as it is important to learn from this trajectory.  
 
 
Mapping capabilities and competitiveness 
 
We now compare the technological capabilities patterns discussed above with 
competitiveness indicators to see whether there is a relationship between the two. As 
competitiveness indicators we use the firm’s export share over total local firms’ exports, 
the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of the firm’s exports in the past 3 to 5 years, 
and the firms’ financial result (profit, break even or loss).14 We have firm-level export 
                                                            
14 We would like to include export value per worker as another competitiveness measure, but we do not 
yet have consistent employment data across all local firms for a given time period. 
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data from TIDI for the past 11 years – from 2004/05 to 2014/15. We calculated export 
value and share of total apparel exports as well as the CAGR for the last five (2011/11-
2014/15) and last three (2012/13-2014/15) years. A problem with this measure is that it 
only goes until 2014/15 and thus does not correspond with our interview data that was 
gathered in June 2016, which is the end of the year in the Ethiopian calendar. So, some 
firms might have just started exporting in the year 2015/16 or may have experienced 
changes in their exports, either increasing or decreasing them. We still use this data as 
firms’ responses to their current total export values are not consistent and reliable. But 
this time lag has to be taken into account. Another competitiveness measure we use is if 
firms made a profit, a loss or broke even, which we derived from the survey data. This is 
a rough indicator and depends on firms’ responses.  
The competitiveness indicators are reported in Table 4, together with the technological 
capabilities scores. Generally, the local firms with the larger export shares have higher 
technological capabilities scores but there are three exceptions: one firm scoring Medium 
that only started exporting more recently and thus has a low export share, and two firms 
scoring Low that have exported for some time on a FOB basis and thus have a higher 
export share but are both struggling. All other firms that scored Low have export shares 
far below 1%, and firms with Low-Medium and Medium scores have higher export 
shares. The two firms with mixed technological capabilities scores have high export 
shares given their size. Generally, exports are concentrated among three firms. The two 
firms with mixed capabilities scores, and exporting made-up textiles, accounted for 
34.2% and 15% of exports, and the private firm with the highest score accounted for 
28.5% of exports. These three firms together accounted for nearly 80% of total local 
firms’ apparel and made-up textiles exports. Other larger players include one more firm 
with a Medium score and two firms with Low-Medium scores, accounting for 5.9%, 5.2% 
and 3.9% of exports respectively.  
For the three firms with Medium technological capabilities scores, the competitiveness 
measures confirm stability or growth of exports, as exports show a stable or positive trend 
in the past years. For one firm there is no data reported on profits or losses; for the other 
two firms, one firm reported profits and one firm reported losses. The three firms with 
Low-Medium scores also show stable or positive export development. Their profit/loss 
indicators are also mixed, showing one firm with profits, one with break even and one 
with losses. For the six firms with Low scores, two firms show positive export 
developments while four firms show negative export developments. They all report either 
break even (two firms) or losses (four firms). In sum, with the exception of the two firms 
scoring Low and still showing positive export developments, all other firms that have 
Low technological capabilities scores also have negative export developments, while 
firms with Low-Medium and Medium scores have stable or positive export developments. 
On the profit/loss indicator, the outcomes are less consistent. We can only see that no 
firm with a Low score reports profits. The two firms with Mixed scores show stable and 
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positive exports trends, but both firms report losses, with one indicating that losses 
alternate with break even. 
The above rough comparison of technological capabilities scores and competitiveness 
indicators shows that there is some relationship, but it also highlights the complexity of 
this relationship and that firms may not necessarily need to build all capabilities or even 
should not build all capabilities to be competitive. Rather they need to make strategic 
choices to develop selective capabilities depending on the specific buyer and end market 
context and their trajectories. Hence, assessing technological capabilities needs to take 
place in combination with assessing competitiveness outcomes and the specific 
trajectories of firms in order to understand which capability building strategy makes sense 
and is sustainable or not.  
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Table 4 Technological Capabilities Aggregate Scores and Competitiveness Indicators 
Firm TC Aggregate Score TC Result Firms’ export share (2014/15) Export CAGR* Profit/Break even/Loss Trajectory 
A-FIRM HLMHM MIXED 34,1% stable break even/loss 1 
B-FIRM HLLLM MIXED 15,0% positive loss 1 
C-FIRM HMMHM MED 28,5% stable X 3b 
D-FIRM MMMHL MED 5,9% positive profit 3b 
E-FIRM HLMMM MED 0,4% positive loss 1 
F-FIRM LMMML MED-LOW 5,2% positive break even 3a 
G-FIRM LMMML MED-LOW 3,9% stable profit 3a 
H-FIRM MMLML MED-LOW 1,0% positive loss 2 
I-FIRM MLLLL LOW 2,4% positive break even 3b 
J-FIRM MLLLL LOW 2,0% negative loss 1 
K-FIRM LLMLL LOW 0,4% positive break even 3a 
L-FIRM LLMLL LOW 0,3% negative loss 3a 
M-FIRM LLLLL/ 
LLMLL 
LOW 0,0% negative loss 2 
N-FIRM LLLLL LOW 0,3% negative loss 3a 
 




Of the 48 Ethiopian-owned apparel and textile firms, only 14 firms were exporting 
apparel or made-up textiles in June 2016 when we conducted the survey. Generally, 
locally-owned firms have comparatively low technological capabilities despite important 
diversity among the 14 firms. Apart from the two firms with Mixed scores, which results 
from being FOB-textile but exporting made-up textiles and having also low capabilities 
in other categories, of the 12 other firms, 50% score an overall Low, 25% score Medium-
Low and the remaining 25% score Medium. Two out of three of the firms with Medium 
scores are vertically integrated firms producing apparel on a FOB basis, some of which 
are produced with their own fabric. The third firm scoring Medium is engaged in both 
CMT and FOB but scored comparatively high on most other capabilities. Of the three 
firms that scored Medium-Low, one firm is engaged in both CMT and FOB and the other 
two are CMT firms that have built higher capabilities on other categories. The six firms 
with Low scores include four CMT firms that scored also low on other capabilities and 
two firms engaged in FOB that are struggling more than the other FOB firms to build the 
capabilities required for that function. In sum, there are FOB and CMT firms with 
comparatively higher capabilities, including stable relationships with buyers; and there 
are FOB and CMT firms that are struggling in developing the capabilities most important 
for their specific function, which also have more unstable buyer relationships.  
 
Generally, there is a trend towards FOB and particularly vertical integration to FOB-
textile, particularly in the knit segment and for firms working with EU buyers. For these 
firms this is seen as a way to become competitive given the context of Ethiopia where 
factors exogenous to the firms result in delays to receive inputs, combined with firms’ 
lack of experience with global inputs sourcing. This allows using an advantage of 
Ethiopia, which is the existence of a history of local textile and cotton production, but 
requires updating machinery and technology in textiles to be able to fulfill buyers’ fabric 
requirements, which is expensive. But there is another group of local firms that are not 
focusing on building capabilities to functionally upgrade to FOB or FOB-textile, but on 
production and product capabilities while remaining CMT suppliers. Such a strategy 
seems to be possible and sustainable with certain buyers that prefer CMT as well as 
understand the context of Ethiopia, particularly in terms of meeting delivery times. A few 
US sportswear and workwear buyers sourcing quite standard products with longer 
delivery and lead times fit this type of buyer and have had stable relationships with some 
local firms. 
 
Despite these different trajectories, all firms are struggling to meet export requirements. 
On the production capability side, the biggest challenges for most firms has been 
productivity and not on time delivery, related to factors endogenous and exogenous to 
firms, while internal reject rates have been manageable. On product capabilities, most 
firms produce basic products, which is largely seen as necessary at this stage as otherwise 
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productivity will decrease even more. However, in the future some firms have plans to 
move to more intermediate and also complex products, but this will also depend on the 
type of buyers. For firms that have stable relationships with buyers, buyers tend to help 
their suppliers, particularly through giving feedback during their quality control checks; 
however, buyers generally do not support firms further. Linkages with public sector 
institutions are important in Ethiopia given the pro-active industrial policy and related 
schemes, including support in capability building and learning through funding 
benchmarking studies and expatriates and offering training for workers. However, 
linkages among firms that can play an important role in learning are very minimal, and 
the industry association is not effective in furthering such linkages. This leaves a 
potentially important learning channel for local firms unused.  
 
Learning is a costly process and takes time, and thus many local firms are experiencing 
losses or just break even in their export business due to their low productivity (vis-à-vis 
international standards) combined with low prices set by buyers. The Ethiopian 
government sees this and has offered loans through the Development Bank of Ethiopia 
that allow for grace periods, but most importantly straddling the domestic and export 
market plays an important role in this regard. With the exception of two local exporting 
firms, all other local firms produce apparel for the domestic market while they are 
learning how to meet the cost, quality and delivery standards of export markets. 
Therefore, local firms use the domestic market as a means to subsidize the cost of learning 
to compete. Firms that are part of diversified businesses also seem to fund losses in 
apparel exporting through their other business activities. But the domestic market is more 
important than just supporting exports, as most firms have strategies for the domestic 
market, including branded product lines, and also use what they learn in exporting in 
terms of productivity, quality and design for their domestic market business.  
 
As profits are higher in the protected domestic market, the question is why local firms 
export at all. The survey results indicate that local firms export in order to get access to 
foreign exchange, but also to be able to access government incentives in terms of finance, 
expatriates and training, and to increase their knowledge on production processes and 
product design and reach international best practices (i.e. in order ‘to learn’). Some local 
firms also predict that the domestic market will not be protected forever, and thus they 
must increase their capabilities to international standards in order to be able to compete 
in a liberalized domestic market at some future date. 
 
This paper presented and assessed the technological capabilities of locally-owned export 
firms in Ethiopia’s textile and apparel sector, and identified trajectories and related 
challenges in building capabilities. The next step is to understand and explain what drives 
capability building and hence why some firms decide to and are more successful in 
building certain capabilities and others not. This is the focus of the next part of the 
AfriCap research project, where we are conducting in-depth firm histories with a 
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strategically selected sample of the locally owned firms based on the trajectories 
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Annex Apparel Sector Local Firm Survey Questionnaire 
 
PART I:  FIRM PROFILE 
Name of firm  
Address (industrial zone) 
Website 
 
Name of interviewee 
Job title  
Duration of employment  
 
Ownership structure/nationality a) Indigenous (ethnicity) 
b) Indigenous-diaspora (lived outside the country for an extended 
period of time) 
c) Diaspora (may not have citizenship, but lives their 
permanently) 




Date of establishment 
Date of production/export 
 
 
Number of factories & 
locations 
 
Number of employees 
Development (10 years) 
 
Functions today? 
Has the firm taken up or 
dropped functions in the last 
10 years? Does firm aim to 
change functions? If yes, 
explain? 
a) CMT-subcontracting 
b) CMT-direct buyer 
c) Full package/FOB 
d) ODM 
e) Textile (knit or woven) 
f) Produce for the domestic market (production, design, 
retail) 
What is produced in the firm?  
Name main products. 
 
 
Percentage of production that 




Export destinations (%) a) Europe 
b) USA 
c) South Africa 
d) Other 
Total annual turnover, 
production & exports (USD, 
volume & value) 
Development (10 years) 
                        Turnover:               Production:               Exports: 
Today: 
5 years ago: 
10 years ago: 
 
PART II: INVESTMENT 
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Was a feasibility study 






Had the owner/GM 
experience in the sector or 





How did the firm get 
managerial expertise and 
skilled labour in the 
beginning? 
 
a) Buy it from abroad (foreigners). From where? 
b) Employ nationals with previous work experience in 
apparel. From which firms? 
a) Trained workers and/or managers 
How were main products 
selected? 
 
b) Just following what other firms do 
c) Producing what buyers demand 
d) Conducted analysis/market research 
How was the investment 
finance raised?  
How was working capital 
raised? 
a) Foreign bank 
b) State development bank 
c) Locally owned private bank 
d) Equity/venture capital 




How did the firm access domestic first-tier supplier? 
Others: 
How did the firm access/establish contact to export buyers? 
How much info did you 
have & analysis did you 






PART III:  END MARKET 
Who are main buyers? How 
many? 
Which respective end markets? 
Main buyers: 
Main end markets: 
 
How stable are your 




b) Somewhat stable 
c) Ad hoc 
Does the firm have a direct 




Does firm aim to enter/extend 
direct contacts?  






Who are the intermediaries?  
How many? 
Share of top 3? 
 




b) Yes, but passive 
c) Yes, proactive 
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b) Yes, but passive 




Explain? Main challenges? 
Have you lost or dropped buyers?  a) No 
b) Yes 
Why? 
Has the firm engaged in market 




Info from where? How? 
 
What are minimum requirements 
from buyers?  
Which functions?  
Which standards? 
 
If firm has more buyers, have they 
different requirements?  
What are challenges to fulfill 
them? 
 
Have demands & capabilities 
expected from buyers increased in 
the last 10 years?  
How do you deal with this? 





Have buyers supported or blocked 
developing new or deepening 




How does communication with 
buyers/intermediaries take place? 
 





How? On what issues? 
What does the firm do to keep 
buyers? 
 
What are the payment terms 
with buyers?  
Differences with buyers? 
a) CMT 
b) FOB 
What are main challenges in selling FOB? 
a) Access to working capital 
b) Letter of credit 
c) Buyers’ payment terms 
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d) Others 
How much working capital is tied 
up in sourced inputs, storage, 
production and waiting for 
payment? 
Per month (?) 
Does the firm have a pricing 
department?  
How long is the pricing lead time? 
a) No 
b) Yes 








Does the firm also sell to 
domestic market?  
a) No 
b) Yes 
What are main buyers/sales channels? 
Which functions & capabilities 
does the firm provide in the 
domestic market?  
How changed (10 years)? 
 
What are advantages & challenges 




PART IV: PRODUCT 







Unit price of main products 
(in real term)? 
Average unit price (in real 
term)?  
Development (10 years)?  
 
Do these products differ per 





Have you introduced new 
and/or more complex 










Which ones? Why? 





What is the average order 
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What is the minimum and 
maximum order size range 




Do you face challenges 




How do you deal with this? 
Does firm want to change 







a) Higher prices 
b) Less risk 
c) Less seasonality/flexibility 
d) Satisfy buyer 
e) Access to new buyers/markets 
f) Other 











What is the average sampling lead time? 
How is functional division 
of work between buyer and 
firm related to design & 
product development? 
 
How is own design for 
export markets developed? 
How do you learn about 
design & product 
development? 
 
Number of designers 
employed (with/without 
formal degree)?  
Number: 
Number with formal degree: 





Share of own designed & 
developed exports?  
 





Attendance of international 





Has the firm invested in 





R&D expenditures in 
design & product 
development?  
R&D % of payroll:  
 






development & design 
capabilities does the firm 




How is own design for 














Has the firm increased 
variety and/or complexity of 
products in the last 10 
years?  
a) Yarn or fabric 
b) Knit or woven 
 
Variety of products: 










Does the firm have its own 




Share of textile used in 
own apparel production?  
Domestic market or 
export?  
Share sold to other firms? 
Share exported directly? 
 
What are main challenges in 
textile production for export 
(direct/indirect)?  
Is the type of product and 
quality aligned to export 
markets?  
Do buyers support or bock 
use of own textile? 
 
 
PART V:  PRODUCTION  
EFFICIENCY & PRODUCTIVITY 
Annual profit before tax  
Labour productivity 
Development (10 years)  
Output per employee: 
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Unit cost of production of 
main product (raw material 
cost, labor cost, overheard 





How much working capital is 
tied up per months? 
 
Work in progress inventory  Days: 
Total inventory  
 
Days: 
Not on time deliveries as a % 
of all deliveries 
 
Not in full deliveries as a % 
of all deliveries 
 
Lead time (from receiving an 
order to delivery)  
 
Throughput time within 
factory (from receipt of raw 
materials to finished product) 
 
 
MACHINERY & PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Which machines are used?  
Age of machinery? 
Up to date machinery? 
 
Which cutting equipment does 
firm have? 
a) By hand 
b) Automated 
Total machinery & technology 
investment in last 10 years?  
Top 3 areas? 
 
Has the factory invested in 
new production processes or 
new work practices in last 10 




Has firm undertaken R&D to 











What does it do? 
 
LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
Share of management, 
technicians, administrative 





Share of expatriate workers? 
In which positions?  
Development (10 years)? 
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Have locals increased their 
share in management, 
technical jobs, supervisors? 
a) No 
b) Yes 




Average per year: 
Average per year: 
Average per year: 




What is it? 
How are workers paid? 
Are there any bonuses/benefits 
for workers?  
a) Time-based 
b) Piece rates 
c) Time and productivity based 
d) Discretionary (with bonuses and fines) 
e) Other: 







Provided internally or externally? 
Expenditures on training as % 
of payroll  
 
Development in last 10 years? 
 






What changes would you make? 
a) No ideas  
b) Standard ideas 
c) Proactive, strategic ideas 
 
QUALITY CONTROL 
Average internal reject, 
scrap and rework rate (per 
unit of production/order)  
 
Development (10 years)? 
 
Average buyers’ return rate 
(per order) & development 
(10 years)? 
 
Are quality management 




At what stages of the 
production process is quality 
checked?  
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What changes would you make? 
a) No ideas  
b) Standard ideas 
c) Proactive, strategic ideas 
 
COMPLIANCE 
Compliance with safety & labour 
standards?  
Share of unsatisfactory buyer or 
public audits?  
What were main issues?  




Compliance with environmental 
standards?  
Share of unsatisfactory buyer or 
public audits?  
What were main issues?  





PART VI: SUPPLY CHAIN LINKAGES 
Where does firm get information 
from on markets, buyers, 
products, technology, production, 
etc.? 
a) Local firms 
b) Foreign firms 
c) Buyers 
d) Hired consultants 
e) Industry association  
f) Relevant ministry/public institution 
g) Other:   






How often does it meet? 
Main benefits for your firm? 
Does the firm participate in 
collaborative schemes or 
informally with other firms? If so, 
what kind of schemes (training, 
input sourcing, etc.)? 
a) Limited links with other firms 
b) Medium links 
c) Close networks 
How often does the firm seek 
knowledge or advice from other 
firms on how to improve 
production and marketing? 
a) Not very often 
b) Sometimes 
c) Very often 
Which firms? 
FULL PACKAGE FIRMS 




What % of local inputs used? 




















What are the main challenges in 
managing input sourcing? 
 
Supplier lead times? 
 
 
Return rates to suppliers?  
 
 
Production lost to inputs 
unavailability/not in time/in full 
delivery?  
Development (10 years)? 
 
Does the firm have an input 






How many employees? 
Which formal degrees? 
Are local providers used for support 
services? Or is it provided in-house?  
Embroidery 
a) In-house 
b) Local supplier 
Washing 
a) In-house 
b) Local supplier 
Dyeing 
a) In-house 
b) Local supplier 
Other: 
Are business services sourced? a) No 
b) Yes 
From whom? 










c) Low value products 
Other? 
 
PART VII: LOGISTICS, FINANCE & SUPPORT 
Does the firm have relationships 
with external public & private 
institutions? 
Which are most important 
institutions?  
a) Limited links with institutions 
b) Medium links 
c) Close networks 
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Does the government (Ministry of 
Industry, industry-specific 
agencies) provide support services 
to the sector?  




What kind of support services? 
a) No 
b) Yes 
Which? Are they useful? 
Does the firm have access to 
sufficient investment and working 
capital?  
What is the interest rate? 
Does the firm access finance through 










How effective are customs clearance 
services?  
a) Very effective 
b) Effective 
c) Not very effective 
Why? 
Does the firm interact with any 
education or research institute?  
a) No 
b) Yes 
Which ones? How? 
Does the firm buy management, 
technical or administrative/IT 







a) Foreign firms 
b) Domestic firms 
How often? 
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